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ABSTRACT
Advoca tes of strong artificial intelligence believe that
properly programmed computers can go beyond the simulation of
intelligent acts so as to instantiate and exhibit true
intelligence, that is, intelligence egui valent to that of man.
In this thesis, I consider three problems for strong-AI.
First, John Searle's well-known thought experiment of
the "Chinese Room" is used to reestablish the syntax-semantics
distinction and to show how this distinction applies to
computer programs.

I review the Chinese Room, consider a

variet y of objections to it, and then expand on the key points
in Searle's work.
Second, 1 examine the Frame Problem in artificial
intelligence, a guest ion made popular by Daniel Dennett.
Ra tional agents have the ability to adjust their conceptual
schemes and update their noetic web of beliefs so as to
maintain a representation of the world.
observed but not well understood.
this ability altogether.

This ability is easily

r argue that computers lack

The Frame Problem examines this

deficiency and programming technigues designed to overcome it.
Third, the Overseer Problem examines the need for
artificial systems to have a rational agent in place who
designates a given task and determines when that task is
successfully completed by the system.

I argue that as long as

this need exists, artificial systems cannot be considered
intelligent in an uneguivocal sense.
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INTRODUCTION
We are about to conceive of the knower as a computing machine.
Warren S. McCulloch, M.D.
"Through the Den of the Metaphysician," 1954
I am prepared to go so far as to say that within a few years, if there
remain any philosophers who are not familiar with some of the main
developments in artificial intelligence, it will be fair to accuse them of
professional incompetence, and that to teach courses in philosophy of
mind, epistemology ... without discussing . . . aspects of artificial
intelligence will be as irresponsible as giving a course in physics which
includes no quantum theory.
Aaron Sloman
The Computer Revolution in Philosophy, 1978

Often in the history of philosophy, philosophers have had
to field concerns, guestions, and claims from other disciplines.
This is such a time.

Artificial intelligence, once an obscure

corner of computer science, raises guestions and makes claims
tha t tradi tionall y belong to the epistemologist and metaphysician, to the philosopher of language and mind, as well as
the psychologist and neurophysiologist.

In this work, I will

examine some of the philosophical concerns surrounding these
claims.
1. The Problem

Let's start to outline the field of interest with some
terms.

The first is "strong artificial intelligence."

This term

names the position that, as Michael Arbib says, "AI programs
really could exhibit understanding or intelligence, rather than
simply simulate aspects of behaviors we construe as
intelligent when performed by a human being" (emphasis mine).l.
"Weak AI" is similar to the former view although weak AI is
limited to simUlation and makes no claims about true machine
intelligence.

I will use "Alers" to designate supporters of

D
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strons-AI.

"AI" itself is an elusive term to define, but here

are a couple of attempts by those in the field:
Al is that part of computer science concerned with designing
intelligent computer systems, Le. systems that exhibit the
characteristics which we associate with intelligence in human
behaviour--e.g. understanding language, learning, reasoning,
solving problems etc. z
[A system is artificially intelligent] if the task [the system]
is carrying out would require intelligence if performed by
humans. a

Why is it that AI has been such a hot topic philosophicall y?

One reason is that philosophers perceive a major

misunderstandins of computer science claims at the popular
level.

This often happens when technical terms--in any field,

not just computer science--are imported back into popular
wri tins.

Another reason lies in the sometimes outlandish

claims of Alers that reach far beyond their field.

Consider for

example this scenario envisioned by Carnes ie-Mellon researcher
Hans Moravec.

One day all knowledse and skills will be stored

in computers and "down-loaded" to people whenever they require
such expertise.
This will result in a gradual erosion of individuality, and
formation of an incredibly potent community. . .. [Which will
be] constantly improving and extending itself, spreading
outwards from the solar system, converting non-life into
mind. . .. This process, possibly occurring now elsewhere,
might convert the entire universe into an extended thinking
entity.4

If a philosopher or theolosian made such claims, he would not

be taken very seriously.
Let's examine strons-AI more closely.

"Intellisent

beha vior" is picked out, somewhat intuitively, and identified

n
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wi th those acts carried out by humans that artifacts (normally)
cannot carry out.s

Compu ters can be made to act intelligently

via rule-governed symbol manipulation (i.e., they are
programmed).
shuffler.

The digital computer is a systematic symbol

That is, at one level of computational description,

l's and O's are moved to the right place at the right time
according to the hardware restraints and the software
instruction.

At a deeper level, transistors are systema ticall y

turned on and off.

The program determines the rules by which

these manipulations will occur.

According to this "rules-and-

representations" view (RR), humans also must or might (there is
a spectrum of opinion here) produce intelligent behavior
through an internal set of rules.

Supporters of RR point to

logic and language as paradigm cases of rule governedness
tha t would reguire such mental symbols.

Both humans and

compu ters would, therefore, comprise a larger class of
"information processing systems."

Al though the RR view does

not apply to all branches of computer science, it has domina ted
the AI community for the past twenty years.

Strong AI working

under the RR model is now called classic or "good-oldfashioned-AI" (GOFAI, coined by John Haugeland).
Tradi tionall y optimism runs high in GOFAI.

Herbert Simon

of Carnegie-Mellon Uni versi ty claims that Ii terall y thinking
machines now exist.

In fact, these machines have thoughts in

the strictest sense of the term.""'

Alan Newell, Simon's long-

time associate, claims that intelligence just is physical symbol

n
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manipula tion.

If machines manipulate the symbols in the "right

way," the machines should embody intelligence in precisely the
same sense as humans."7

In a paper by both Simon and Newell

they write,
There are now in the world machines that think, that learn and
that create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is
going to increase rapidly until--in the visible future--the
range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the
range to which the human mind has been applied. El

Marvin Minsky of MIT, perhaps the most important thinker in AI,
thinks that humans might be reduced to household pets by the
next generation of computers.'"

Finally, John McCarthy,

inventor of the term "artificial intelligence," says the
"ascription of mental guali ties is most straightforward for
machines of known structure such as thermostats and computer
opera ting systems • • • • " 1 0
thermosta t

For example, your furnace

has at least three beliefs:

cold, it's just right.

it's too hot, it's too

These are a few of the more celebrated

opinions found in GOFAI circles.
II. General Outline
The subject matter discussed so far is both broad and
deep enough to take in many directions.

I will focus on three,

one per chapter.
Chapter 1 will deal with the syntax-semantics
distinction--actually the failure to maintain this distinction.
AI critics argue that at the core of any digital computer
system is a network of switches.

The on-off manipulations

(even the l's and O's in the machine code) are purely syntactic:

z

4
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tokens are shuffled around in a rule-governed way.
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AIers

counter that at the system level (i.e, the system-as-a-whole),
complex rule-governed behavior allows for the emergence of
semantic content:

the tokens will have meaning.

John Searle's

"Chinese Room" thought-experiment will serve as the pivotal
example through which to address this problem.

I will argue, in

agreement with Searle, that syntax is never sufficient for
semantics, although the Chinese Room example is not without
its shortcomings.
Chapter 2 will focus on what some believe to be an
insurmountable epistemic problem for the RR view, viz., the
Frame Problem.

In short, the frame problem is the computer's

inabili ty to abstract (what we consider to be) important details
from common experience and to then use this information to
guide its future behavior.

I will argue that the frame problem

is not another technical difficulty to be overcome in time, but
ra ther that the classic RR model is inadegua te to handle this
difficulty.

AI is guite possibly in the midst of a paradigm

shift because of the chronic failure to overcome this problem
and because of the early successes of a rival model.
As Thomas Kuhn has shown, to have a paradigm shift,
there must be a rival paradigm.

In Chapter 3 I will briefly

present some key aspects of the rival "connectionist" approach.
The main topic of the chapter is to present yet another difficuI t y, what I will call the Overseer Problem, that affects not
onl y GOFAI computers, but the new connectionist systems as

Koperski
well.
III. An Important Qualifica bon
Eguivocating over technical-operational and popular
terms has a long and glorious history in AI.

Some in the

artificial intelligentsia purposefully deny that there is any
eguivocation.

McCarthy provides a key example:

To ascribe certain "beliefs", "knowledge", "free will",
"intentions", "consciousness", "abilities" or "wants" to
a machine or computer program is legitimate when such an
ascription expresses the same information about the machine
that it expresses about a person,"

Here is a clear case where the metaphorical use of
anthropomorphic terms has ceased to be metaphorical.

I see

nothing wrong with using mental terms to describe the behavior
and function of various computer operations; however, we must
realize that such ascriptions are (usually) intended as
analogies only.

For example, one might describe a chess-

playing computer as believing that its king is in trouble.

In

fact, the computer "believes" nothing nor does it have any
conception of "king" or "chess" for that matter.

The computer

is simply executing the commands it has been programmed to
carry out.

Mental terms used in this analogous way are (or at

least were) useful shorthands in denoting a given behavior.
In Section I of his paper "Artificial Intelligence Meets
Na tural Stupidity," Drew McDermott explains that programmers
sometimes become entranced by

the~r

own "wishful mnemonics.":l.2

McDermott shows how a suggestive subroutine like UNDERSTAND,
GOAL, or ASSERT might get its name before the programmer

z
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knows if his algorithm has any chance of simulating what's
being named •.
If [the programmer] calls the main loop of his program
'UNDERST AND', he is (until proven innocent) merely begging the
question. He may mislead a lot of people, most prominently
himself, and enrage a lot of others. What he should do instead
is refer to this main loop as 'G0034' and see if he can
convince himself or anyone else that G0034 implements some
part of understanding. 1 ::3

Such oversights ultima tel y hurt the AI field.

Slogans

and buzz words, especially when used outside of a technical
context, have come to confuse more than clarify.
Wi th this danger plainly in view, such metaphorical terms
still have heuristic value.

As long as the metaphor is clearly

noted, using 'learns,' 'sees,' etc., to describe computer
behavior is a useful shorthand.

Thus the reader is warned up

front that my use of anthropomorphic terms in this manner in
no way endorses a reduction of any kind.

With this

qualification firmly established, let's enter the Chinese Room •

7
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NOTES
1Michael A. Arbib and Mary B. Hesse, The Construction of
Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versi t y Press, 1986), 25-26.
2Rainer Born, ed., Artificial Intelligence: The Case
Against (New York: Routledge, 1989), viii.

4Hans Moravec, "Intelligent Machines: How to Get There
From Here and What to Do Afterwards." Unpublished, guoted in
Pamela McCorduck. Machines Who Think (New York: W.H. Freeman
and Co., 1979), 354-355.
!SBy 'behavior' here and throughout this work I mean the
movement of parts by the entity in guestion.
6John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge:
Harvard Uni versi t y Press, 1984), 29.

ElThis freguently guoted passage first appeared in H.A.
Simon and A. Newell, "Heuristic Problem Solving: The Next
Advance in Operations Research," Operations Research 6 (Jan.Feb. 1958): 8. Note the date.
9S e arle, 30.
10John McCarthy, "Ascribing Mental Qualities to
Machines," in Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial
Intelligence, ed. Martin Ringle (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.:
Humanities Press, 1979)' 161.

12McDermott, Drew, "Artific:ial Intelligence Meets Natural
Stupidi t y," in Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artific:ial
Intelligence, ed. John Haugeland (Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford
Books, 1981), 143-160.
13Ibid., 144.
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CHAPTER 1
SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND SEARLE
For Searle, intentionality is rather like a wonderful substance secreted by
the brain the way the pancreas secretes insulin. Brains produce
intentionality. he says, whereas other objects, such as computer programs,
do not. . .. Luckily for us . . . our brains make intentionality; if they
didn't we'd behave just as we now do, but of course we wouldn't mean it!
Daniel Dennett
"The Milk of Human Intentionality," 1980
There is a tendency in AI today towards flashy, splashy domains . . . .
Yet there is no program that has common sense; no program that learns
things that it has not been explicitly been taught how to learn . . . .
Douglas Hofstadter
"Artificial Intelligence: Subcognition as Computation," 1983

In the twentieth century, the philosophy of language has
become a hotly contested sub-discipline.

Regardless of one's

position, all agree that many helpful distinctions have been
made.

The distinction I will focus on in this chapter causes

Ii t tle controversy until computer intelligence comes into play.
This is the distinction between syntax and semantics.
Syntax is the realm of symbols (tokens) and their proper
manipula tion. 1

Syntactic rules tell us "what counts": which

tokens are allowed and in what order they are to be recognized.
For example, among the specified tokens in arithmetic we have
'1', '2', '3', '+', and

'='.

In first grade we learn that '2 + 1 = 3'

is an allowable string of arithmetic tokens whereas '2 1 + = 3'
is not.

The symbols are arbitrary, of course, e.g., we know that

'1 + 8 = 9' is the same as 'I + VIII = IX' in Roman numerals.

But

what do we mean by "is the same as?"
To answer this Cjuestion, we enter the realm of
semantics.

h

The Arabic and Roman numerals are the same in the

Koperski
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sense that we assign the same semantic content to '8', 'VIII',
and 'eight'.

Tokens themselves lack semantic content; they are

meaningless.

Tokens only have meaning when they are

interpreted.
Computers are syntactic engines.

In the introduction, we

saw that they manipulate symbols according to the rules of a
given program.

AIers (recall this designates strong-AI, RR

enthusiasts) c:laim that syntactic rules can be of sufficient
complexity when embodied in a computer program so that a
computer can go beyond simple syntax and actually understand
the commands being executed.

That is, given a sufficiently rich

syntactic program code, the computer will provide semantic
content to its symbols.

Under the RR model of cognition, we do

much the same thing--people have an internal syntax that
produces our semantics.
John Searle's main criticism of this view is simple:
There is a distinction between manipulating the syntactical
elements of language and actually understanding the language
at a semantic level. What is lost in the AI simulation of
cognitive behaviour is the distinction between syntax and
semantics,2

Searle's thought-experiment illustrates that manipulating
symbols according to a list of rules will never produce understanding in the mechanism--biological or mechanical--executing
the rules.

In short, syntax is never sufficient for semantics.

I. Searle's Chinese Room: The Argument
The experiment runs as follows
Searle's role).::!!

b

(!

will put myself in

Imagine I am in a small room with baskets full

Koperski
of Chinese language characters.
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It is important to note that I

do not understand Chinese in the least--the characters are
just different tokens to me.

I have been provided with a rule

book, written in English <which I obviously understand), with
instructions for matching these symbols with other symbols.

I

use the term 'symbol' here under the assumption that these
tokens symbolize something to someone.

The rules in the book

govern the manipulation of the symbols by their shape alone; no
translations or meanings are provided.

Outside the room,

native Chinese people have access to two slots, In and Out, and
have no idea what's going on inside.

They slip pieces of paper

with Chinese characters through the In slot and I match these
symbols with those specified by the rule book.

The book

instructs which symbols to then pick out of the baskets and
send through the Out slot.
Unbeknownst to me, the people outside are putting
questions, not just random symbols, in the In slot and, from
their point of view, answers to these questions are coming
through the Out slot.

This exchange is exactly what the

wri ters of the rule book intended.

These "answers" to

"CJuestions" are in perfect Chinese syntax and obey standard
Chinese semantic rules.

As far as the Chinese are concerned,

whoever is in the room seems to understand their language.
But I do not understand Chinese.
The analogy to a digital computer lines up this way.
rule book corresponds to a computer program written in

The
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whatever artificial language you like (e.g., LISP, the
traditional language for AD.

The rule book writers are the

programmers, the only one's who know what's going on inside and
ou tside the room.

The baskets of symbols are a data base.

am the computer, or perhaps specifically the CPU.

I

The In slot

serves as an input terminal and the Out slot is a printer.
The thrust of the argument is really gui te simple:
If I do not understand Chinese solely on the basis of running a
computer program for understanding Chinese, then neither does
any other digital computer solely on that basis. Digital
computers merely manipulate formal symbols according to rules
in the program. o4
We may break the argument down this way:
is able to execute a list of rules that simulates the
understanding of language L to some observer ~.
I)( does not understand L.
Therefore the execution of a list of rules is not
sufficient for I)( to understand L.
I)(

II. The Chinese Room: Application
The thought-experiment is intriguing and for the most
part uncontroversial as i t stands.

Of course, Searle uses the

Chinese Room as a launching pad for a more elaborate argument
consisting specifically of four premises <P) and four
conclusions (C).E.i
(Pi> Brains cause minds.

This premise is unnecessary and

serves primarily to affirm Searle's physicalism.

The mind is

viewed here as a higher order property of the brain (higher,
tha t

is, than say its greyness or solidity).

Searle might agree

with Minsky's belief that "minds are what brains do"; however,
Searle strives to preserve the concept of mind from hasty

Koperski
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reductions, especially those of the elimina ti ve ma terialist. 6
Except for this premise, as Sir John Eccles points out,
Searle's argument could easily come from a dualist in the
philosophy of mind."7
(P2) Syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
strong-AI calls this begging the question.

Of course,

The RR model claims

precisely that semantics will be found to be a property of a
sufficiently rich syntax.

The Chinese Room is meant to

emphasize (and perhaps reestablish> P2.
(P3) Computer programs are purely formal (syntactic).
There is no fundamental reason for programs to be run only on
digital computers since the program itself only specifies
syntactic manipulations.

The symbols at the machine code level

(1's and O's, on and off) are wholly abstract and can be
assigned to any rule-governed system:

water pipes, control

relays, or, according to Searle, "old beer cans strung together
with wires and powered by windmills."

Keep P3 in mind; it will

become important later on.
(P4) Minds have mental contents; specifically, they have
semantic contents.

This premise Searle takes as self-evident

and all of cognitive science assumes it.

The cause, not the

fact, of semantic content is controversial.

Searle now moves

to his conclusions.
(CD No computer program by itself is sufficient to give a
system a mind.

Programs, in short, are not minds and they are

not by themselves sufficient for causing minds.

L

The only

Koperski
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things we know that cause minds, at this point, are brains.
Some mental acti vi ties (e.g., logic:) can obviously be simulated
by computers, so in a (trivial?) sense minds can be described
computationally.

However, simulated "thinking" via

computational symbol manipulation does not imply that thinking
is identical to symbol manipulation.
(C2) The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be
solely in virtue of running a computer program (P1 + CD.
strikes at heart of the RR model.

This

No matter what kind of

internal syntax the RR might claim we have, it will never be
rich enough to explain our semantic behavior.
(C3) Anything else that caused minds would have to have
causal powers at least eguivalent to those of the brain.

The

opacity of the term 'causal powers' will attract critics en
masse.

This problem will be examined in the next section.
(C4) For any artifact that we might build that had mental

states eguivalent to human mental states, the implementation
of a computer program would not by itself be sufficient for
those mental states.

Searle does not deny the possibility of

synthetic intelligence, just that such intelligence will not
simply implement a formal program.

Why not?

Because any

formal rules put into the system could, in principle, be
followed by a human without understanding what the program is
about.

C4 is perhaps simply a corollary of C1.

III. Facing the Critics
In the last ten years, Searle has become one of the most

b
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Not surprisingly, the

Chinese Room has drawn fire from all corners of cogni ti ve
science.

In this section, I will examine some of these

cd tic isms and offer possible replies.

I assume that Searle

would agree with these replies to his cd tics, since some of
these he offers himself, but I cannot guarantee this across
the board.
A. "Causal Powers" [C3J:

What does this mean?

Many

critics wonder aloud what these causal powers might be.
Searle leaves his explanation at a rather intui ti ve level
saying only that physical systems do not exhibit intentionality-a t least not yet.

However, as a physicalist, Searle cannot

call on a mind or soul to serve as the metaphysical seat of
ei ther agent causality or intentions.

Other physicalists want

a material analysis of these causal powers, and right 1y so.
Reply.

Whatever they are, the brain's causal powers are

more than just the ability to execute the next rule in a
syntactic code, which is all the symbols in a program can do.
Without question, we do need science to help uncover the
nature of these causal powers of the brain, but the causal
powers of l's and Q's are already well understood: they are
abstract symbol carriers only.

Furthermore, whether a machine

has these causal powers is an empirical question.

How so?

Recall Searle has no theoretical objections to the possibility
of synthetic intelligence (see C4), thus machines with causal
powers might be invented someday.s

b

The point is, instantiating

Koperski
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a program is not sufficient to provide such machines with
causal powers.

It is this syntactic insufficiency that the

Chinese Room is directed against, not the possibility of manmade intelligence.
I agree with Searle's critics that "causal power" is a
very opaque term that invites abuse.

If such powers are

empiricall y testable, as Searle claims, it would help if he
provided at least an outline for the criteria we might employ
to find them.

Without any empirical guidelines, such causal

powers remain quite mysterious and out of place for a
physicalist.

In fact, intention ali t y and agent causation are

tradi tionally called on by dualists to criticize reductive
theories in the philosophy of mind.

Critics rightly sense that

these elements are difficult to make coherent in a physicalist
system.
B. Counterexample: Haugeland's Demon (H-demon). '"

In

trying to nail down Searle's application of causal powers, John
Haugeland has proposed this counterexample.

Consider person

0<

who has been struck with a rare disease such that his brain's
neurotransmitters no longer send signals from neuron to
neuron.

We install in o<'s brain an H-demon that "tickles the

appropriate synapse of the next neuron in a way that is
functionally indistinguishable, to that neuron, from the arrival
of genuine neurotransmitters."1.0

The demon is so quick that it

never falls behind and o<'s brain continues to function.
question for Searle is, does this brain still have

b

The
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intentionality (and therefore causal powers)?
Reply.

Searle does not back down:

"[o<'sJ neurons still

ha ve the right causal powers; they just need help from the
demon."1:I.

That is, i f the H-demon can reproduce the activity

wi thin the brain as i f i t were working properly, then yes, the
causal powers are maintained and so is intentionality.
Searle's critics do not like this reply since i t
slightly firms up the notion of causal powers.

only

The empirical

cri terion asked for seems to be simply "x has causal powers i f f
x is a working brain."

I believe, however, that Searle's reply

is consistent with his main point against GOFAI.

Note that the

H-demon does not follow a set of rules (e.g., a computer
program) to keep o<'s brain going.

This new demon-brain system

might be semi-artificial or synthetic (thus possibly
intentional, see last reply)' but as long as the demon-brain
operates by a means other than rule execution, the H-demon is
not an example of strong-AI.

Therefore this is not a

counterexample to the Chinese Room.
C. The Systems Reply.
computer and neuro-science.

This criticism comes from both
In short i t says, "You do not

understand Chinese, but the room as a whole does."

The

Chinese Room is not complete i f we just focus on me, the guy
inside.

The room is also data banks of symbols plus the rule

book plus scratch pads ••
system, not just me.

Understanding is ascribed to the

As Haugeland puts it, "the system as a

whole manipulates the tokens in ways appropriate to what they

,

L
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mean, with no intervention from outside users; and that's
semantic activity."12

Searle confuses different levels of

description and attribution.
example,

"1

According to Daniel Dennett, for

understand English; [my] brain doesn't • • . ," 13

No

one wants to ascribe understanding to the computer's CPU.
Searle is simply looking too deep.

If the system exhibits

semantic activity, then at the system level we can ascribe
understanding to it.
Reply.

System level ascription does not escape the

syntactic-semantic distinction:

"[If] I, as the central

processing unit, have no way of figuring out what any of these
symbols mean; , •• [then] neither does the whole system."14
That is, i f I don't understand the Chinese symbols, then no
ma t ter how many useful things you throw in with me, the room
doesn't understand either.
Consider a counterexample, suggested by Searle.
memorize the rule book and the symbols in the baskets.
system is no more; there's just me.

I
The

I can now apparently read

and write Chinese, but the guestion is whether I understand
Chinese the same way I understand English.

Clearly I do not.

I

am following the rules I have memorized for dealing with
Chinese characters, but I still don't know what they mean,
"Whereas the English subsystem knows that 'hamburger' refers
to hamburgers, the Chinese subsystem knows only that 'sguiggle
sguiggle' is followed by 'sguoggle sguoggle'."H5

The key

difference again rests on what I, as a knowing subject, self-
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No outside

observer can unerringly make this judgment.
D. Faulty Model of the Mind-Brain.

Although this

criticism has many versions, I will focus on Marvin Minsky's:
! don't mean to say that brains or minds are simple; brains are
immensely complex machines--and so are what they do ..
Whenever we speak about a mind, we're referring to the
processes that move our brains from state to state. 1S

Minsky's point is closely related to the usual criticisms about
folk psychology.

That is, most or all of the events named by

prescientific mental terms, including Searle's "intentionality"
and "causal powers," are simply the result of a highly complex,
physical process.

Eventually these pre scientific terms will be

reduced or replaced by a mature mind science.

Searle's

analysis forces us to give credence to opaque terms derived
from our own limited introspection.

Before we say what

computers can or cannot understand, let's first allow
neuroscience and AI to run their course so we really know
what's going on.
Reply. Searle's reply continues on the same theme.

A

full y mature neurophysiology with precise scientific jargon will
not erase the difference between a belief ascribed to an
artifact and a belief had by a person.:!."?

For the sake of

scientific research, one can certainly put humans, computers,
and thermostats on a relative "belief continuum."

But the

point Searle comes back to again and again is that our
ascriptions cannot change the real, first-person, qualitative
difference between a machine's behavior and our experience.
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The gulf between my knowing Chinese and behaving as i f I know
Chinese cannot be bridged by a new scientific description of
the process.
E. Misleading Analogy.

The Chinese Room gives the

impression that the subject is doing the equivalent of
manipulating an AI program by hand. us

The reader is led to

identify with Searle's "feeling the lack of understanding
Chinese."

I

But human execution of a complex language program

made for a digital computer would take years!
mention this and for good reason.

Searle doesn't

If the question-and-answer

transaction with the Chinese people outside the room took
years, the questioners would no longer believe anyone in the
room understood Chinese.

Once this time factor is revealed,

Searle's intui ti ve link with the reader fails and so does the
thought-experiment.
Reply_
compelling.

The responses to this problem are concise and
First, we could replace the man in the room with

Haugeland's H-demon, which is very fast.
program now is on par with a computer.

Hand manipulating the
But when we ask the

(English speaking) H-demon i f he understands Chinese, we get
the same result as before.

Second, when did speed become a

criterion for intelligence?

How fast someone solves a problem

or thinks about a question might be a measure of his
intelligence, but time is not a factor in determining whether a
subject is intelligent.

Bringing in a speed element is ad hoc.

F. Intuition pump.:!.'"
1£
Q

£
z:
t

R

For those already sympathetic to
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the strong-AI side, this is possibly the most damaging
criticism.

Unfortunately for Searle, his entire "argument" is

nothing but an intuition pump.

He doesn't really assert

anything, but Searle gets the reader to nod his head in
agreement and say to himself, "Yea, he's right.
know whether I understood Chinese are not."
Block, Searle has a hidden premise:
to overrule the intui tions."2o

I would surely

According to Ned

"Evidence isn't sufficient

After all, our intuitions once

told us Earth is stationary, large objects fall faster than
small, etc.
conform.

When evidence is introduced, our intuitions must

Searle is unfair in two ways.

evidence is at the mercy of intuition.

First, he acts like
Second, he does not deal

wi th any of the evidence for the AI side.

Such hand-waving

over the successes of the field should not be tolerated.
Reply.

'Intuition' is used here in an egui vocal way.

On

one hand, one's intuitions (Le., thoughts or opinions) about the
goings on in the Chinese Room are irrelevant.

The point of the

illustration is to emphasize a conceptual truth that is usually
well understood:

syntax is not semantics.

The Chinese Room

attempts to recapture the idea that shuffling uninterpreted
formal symbols is not the same as understanding their meaning_
On the other hand, 'intuition' has an epistemic sense regarding
one's first-person experience of a si tua tion.

I know

intuitively (i.e., directly and with certainty) that I don't
understand Chinese.

This use is different from the popular

use of 'intuitive insight' as in "women's intuition."

The second

r
II
I
~

~~

!
I

I
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use of 'intuition' is what Searle appeals to in most of his
replies.

No third-person observer can have a subject's direct,

first-person intuition that the subject does or does not
understand a given symbol.
In conclusion, Searle's critics often try to take the
Chinese Room beyond the very limited scope intended.

In almost

every case, the rep I y refocuses the discussion on the key
issues of syntax-semantics and first-person understanding (or
lack of understanding).

These are the conceptual pillars

Searle is trying to save from a behavioral reduction.
IV. Beyond the Chinese Room
Why is it that the Chinese Room invokes so much
cri ticism?

i

Most Alers point to the intuition pump.

The

computer science successes brought about by the RR model are
thought to be a decisive blow against anyone (especially
bothersome philosophers) who relies solely on non-empirical
arguments.

Although complete brain simulation might be a

technological impossibility, under the RR theory there is no
physical impossibility preventing the brain's rule-governed
acti vi t y from being captured by a program.

If we could only

discover the correct rules and if we had a medium of sufficient
complexi ty, Alers claim, we would have uneguivocal, nonmetaphorical, artificial intelligence.
In this section, I will present an adaptation of the
Chinese Room to try to determine where the line is drawn on
the application of the RR model (Le., what is it that we may
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RR enthusiasts will likely object that my

application is not what they intended their criteria to be used
for; however, the thought-experiment is a well established
device to determine where a theory might lead.
A. Another Thought Experiment.

As I was studying one

morning, a small robot crawled into my room, handed me a book,
and promptly disappeared.
the history of AI research.

The book (copyright 2025) contained
In the year 2020, engineers at

IBM-Xerox, Inc. invented (i.e., will invent) the UBS (Ultimate
Brain Simulation) program.

UBS was run on a highly advanced

optic-digi tal computer, the CRAY-7.

With speed and memory

many orders of magnitude higher than in previous decades, UBS
on the CRAY-7 can produce any semantic behavior desired.
According to the now mature RR model of cognition, the CRAY-7
instantiates true intelligence.
In 2021, Ed, an electrical engineer who dabbled in
necromancy, got a copy of UBS but decided not to run it on the
CRAY-7.

A formal program, after all, has no intrinsic

preference for what physical apparatus carries it out.
In Ed's wizardly experiments, he learned to conjure up a
small demon (much like the H-demon described earlier).

This H-

demon is not only quick but transdimensional, "blinking" in and
out of any location instantaneously.

Ed teaches the H-demon

to leave flashlights at every planet and moon in the galaxy.
Ed decides to run UBS on a galactic scale.
Impossible?

As I mentioned in the introduction, at a
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deep level of description a digital computer is a system of
electronic switches that are either on or off, depending on the
program instruction.

Theoretically, any medium that can keep

track of two physical states (on and off) can carry out a
program.
Ed teaches the demon to read the UBS code and switch

the flashlights on-off as the code instructs. 21

The demon

periodically checks with Ed for any new commands (lOinterrupts"
in computer jargon).
Now i f running UBS instantiates true human-level
intelligence, should we expect the CRAY-7, and now the galaxy
itself, to have beliefs, perhaps an idea of "self," and even
free will 7

What criteria would we appl y7

The philosophically

interesting guestion the galactic brain experiment points to
is, If intelligence is a property, I, what are we to count as
candidates for intelligence, x7

Since persons (a) are

intelligent--the paradigm case i f you will--certainly the
variable x can be replaced with the name of any person, Ia
(read lOa is intelligent").

Alers also want to substitute certain

computers (d that meet the RR criteria for intelligence, Ic.
Now we have another medium that meets 'the RR criteria; but
does anyone want to count the galaxy (g) as a candidate for
intelligence, Ig7

What criterion in the RR model allows Ia and

Ic but disallows Ig7

There are none.

B. Trying to Fix RR.
limi t the domain of x.

There are two possible criteria to

First, Alers could argue the galactic
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This rule is derived

from the fact that semantic behavior is not observable from a
system that takes months or years to reply to an inquiry.

The

problem with this criterion is that the RR model does not
consider speed.

Adding a time qualifier is clearly an ad hoc

fix, but let's allow it for now.
The galactic brain could still meet the new criteria.
Instead of one H-demon blinking around space, Ed conjures up
trillions of H-demons.

Better still, Ed discovers that demons

have trans-dimensional sight.

He puts one H-demon per

flashlight so each demon can read the program code on Earth
and also see the other lights going on/off.

Speed would then

approach the new requirements.
The second new criterion possible is spatial localization:
Ix only if x is spatially localized.
but this fix fails as well.
localiza tion?

g is undeniably non-local,

What is the standard for

On a human scale, g is not localized; on a

uni versal scale, g is very localized (i.e., g is not undeniably
non-loca!).
hoc fix.

Like the speed objection, this one is another ad

I cannot alter the galactic brain to fit this time, but

such subjective standards tend to weaken the strong-AI case.
I believe the "what counts" problem for the object of
predicate I runs throughout the Chinese Room debate.

Consider

three levels of use for mental terms, including intelligence.
Level one (LU is the neural level.

Many believe Ll is where we

find the sufficient conditions for semantic behavior.

Neuro-
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the common

use of mental terms has to do with people, not neural
interactions.

Psychology focuses on L2 while AI picks and

chooses between L1 and L2.

There is also an L3 at the level of

corporate objects like nations and companies.

We say things

like "General Motors loves its customers" and "the United
States wants all foreign governments • . . • "
Pure reductionists want to dispel with L2 and L3.
Prereflecti vel y, everyone agrees tha t attributing mental
properties or actions to corporate objects is highly
metaphorical.

Reductionists go further to say mentalistic

terms used in folk psychology are likewise non-technical and
confusing and will eventually be replaced by scientific terms
(see Minsky above).

We should disregard the upper levels of

mental description in favor of what's "really" going on:

neural

interaction.
The more common view is to agree with the reductionist
about corporate objects, but reject the wholesale reduction of
L2 to L1.

Mental terms like 'belief' and 'intention' are not

sufficiently captured or explained by neural phenomena.

This

is the position of Searle and substance dualists. 2 2

c.

Operationalism.

There is a shadowy middle ground

between reductionism and folk psychology that sometimes goes
unrecognized in the AI debate.

This terri tory is held by

opera tionalism, an approach to the philosophies of mind and
science that will become very important in chapter 3.

The
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operationalists hold that L2 terms (beliefs, desires, etc.) are
useful and should not be reduced to Ll terms.

This differs

with Searle and the dualists in that, although useful, L2 terms
for the operationalist have no more ontological weight than L3,
the corporate-mental terms.
Here is an example by Dennett.

Consider terms used by

loggers in Maine:
You can 'trick' an apple tree into 'thinl~ing it's spring' by
building a small fire under its branches in the late fall; it will
blossom. This way of talking is not just picturesque and is
not really superstitious at all; it is simply an efficient way
of making sense of I controlling, predicting, and explaining the
behavior of these plants in a way that nicely circumvents one's
ignorance of the controlling mechanisms. 2 ,",

L2 is especially needed when a system becomes too
complex to predict its behavior in Ll terms.

That is, it's fine

to talk about a robot "wanting to go outside" (L2) when an
explanation in terms of program code and electronics is too
lang or complex.

'Wanting' conveys the idea adeguately.

An al terna ti ve use of mental terms is seen in the
programmer who starts with L2 and works his way to L1.

In a

chess program, for example, the programmer wants to make the
computer protect-the-king.

The nation of protect-the-king

must then be translated dawn to the Ll program code level to
make the system perform the L2 behavior.
L2 is not a property of the system, rather L2 reflects

,
~

b
%

J
f
t
t

l

f

l

our stance or attitude toward the system. 2 4

Note that

operationalists in AI are usually operational only with respect
to L2 and L3 and scientific realists regarding L1.

L2 has

J.____________________
I
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heuristic, predictive value only and has nothing to do with the
nature of the system under investigation--man or machine.

Ll

is where real explanations are found.
Why is operationalism important here?

I mention this

approach because operationalists use mental terms much like
Searle or a dualist would use them.

For the latter two,

however, L2 has more than just heuristic value.

L2 for Searle

sa ys something about the system itself, not just how we might
view it.

The AI debate is about whether a system really is

intelligent or has desires.

Operationalism does little to help

answer this guestion, but might sound to the unwary reader as
if it does.
V. Epistemology and At tribu tion
Some of the confusion over the Chinese Room could be
eliminated if all the participants would maintain a consistent
epistemic relationship to the system being discussed.

That is,

critics often alter their epistemic position without warning
the reader.

By 'epistemic position' (EP) I mean the relationship

between an agent and a state of affairs whereby the agent is
justified in holding certain beliefs about that state of
affairs.
I'm sure an example would be useful.

Say I am in my study

and I come to the belief p that my wife is doing cartwheels in
the living room.

Now I have no evidence for this, thus p is

unjustified given my epistemic position (which coincidentally
corresponds to my physical location).

If however, I go into the
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hall and see my wife's shadow flipping all about and hear the
crash of a lamp on the floor, my epistemic position has changed.
I now have some justification for p.

I t is important to note

that epistemic position does not affect the truth of any
belief.

I can be justified in a belief and still be wrong.

This

last point is simply the well-known distinction between truth
and justification.
Let's apply EP to the Chinese Room.

The Chinese people

only have access to the IN/OUT slots of the room.
epistemic position EP1.

Call their

Given the apparent replies they

receive to their guestions, those at EP1 are justified in
believing p1

= 'someone

inside the room understands Chinese'.

Those in the strong-AI camp argue that we are in an
analogous EP to those at EPl when we approach a highly
sophisticated computer system.

That is, given the system's

semantic behavior, we are justified in believing p2 = 'the
computer understands z' where z is the subject matter of the
program (e.g., chess).

Just like the Chinese people, we have

behavioral evidence that the computer understands what i t is
doing.

p2 might be false, but given our EP, we may rightly

a t tribute intelligence to certain intricate systems.

Or so the

argument goes.
Let's go back to the Chinese Room.

Say one of the

Chinese doesn't like the answer he received and takes a sledge
hammer to the OUT slot.

The window breaks revealing Searle

wi th his rule book and baskets of symbols.

As the Chinese

.1___________________....
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begin to investigate, they come to realize that Searle doesn't
understand a bit of Chinese; he's just doing what his rule book
tells him.

Now their EP has changed from EPl to EP2 given the

new evidence.

At EP2, they are no longer justified in believing

pl.
The key to Searle's experiment is that we are not in an
analogous epistemic position to EPl with respect to complex
computers.

Rather, we are closer to EP2.

what's going on inside:

We know exactly

rule-governed symbol manipulation

following the instructions of a well-defined computer code.

We

can get beyond the behavior of the system down to how the
(apparent) semantic acti vi t y has been genera ted. 25
An anticipated reply to this analysis of EP comes from
the classic "other minds" problem in philosophy.
considers this himself.2c

Searle briefly

I can't know with certainty that

anyone else has a mind (or consciousness or intelligence, etc.)
like I know that I have a mind.

Everyone else could be an

android controlled by Descartes' evil genius.

From my EP, all

the evidence available to me for believing you have a mind is
your behavior.

Why not use the same behavioral criteria for a

computer?
In reply, note that the AI criticism short-changes us on
the available evidence.

The criteria I use to infer that

others have minds is based on our similar behavior in similar
situations, but behavior is not the only thing we have in
common.

t

~

There are both behavioral and physical similarities to
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consider, specifically, I and other humans share a close
neurophysiological similarity that I do not share with
computers.

This commonality is the backbone of Richard

Swinburne's principles of charity and credulity used to deal
with the other-minds objection (see his Evolution of the Soul
pp. 13-17 for a detailed analysis).

The problem with at tribu ting

a mind or intelligence to a computer is our obvious lack of
similari t y in physiology.

At present, neuroscience is not

mature enough to say how far the notion of intelligence can be
removed from the only paradigm case available:

human brains.

Swinburne points out that,
It would be different if we had a well-justified general theory
of consciousness , , , that explained which physical processes
of kinds currently unknown give rise to which mental
events, , "
Then we could examine the Martians and robots to
see whether their physical processes were of a charac ter to
give rise to mental events, i.e, were similar to our own in
whatever respects the theory had identified as crucial for
this,27

In lieu of such a comprehensive mind-theory, our EP
allows us to conclude only that beings with both behavior and
physiology like ourselves are intelligent.

In terms of the

earlier discussion, Ix is limited to x's that are human, at least
for the time being. 2 8

If behavior were all we had to go on to

judge whether a given computer is intelligent, then our EP
would allow for the attribution of intelligence.

But we are not

so limited.
VI. Conclusion
Neither Swinburne (a dualist) nor Searle (a physicalist)
objects to theoretical synthetic intelligence.

The point of the
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Chinese Room is that whatever form this synthetic intelligence
takes, it will not simply instantiate formal rules.
a ffix semantic content as well.

It must

The driving cogni ti ve model of

AI, the RR model, is inadegua te for true intelligence, since it
maintains that syntactic rules are sufficient for semantic
behavior.

But as we have repeatedly seen, there is a distinct,

first -person, guali ta ti ve difference between my understanding
of, say, English, and the ability to act as if I understood
English by following a rich syntactic rule book.
The galactic brain thought-experiment and the discussion
on epistemic position have demonstrated the difference
between our attribution of intelligence to systems for
heuristic purposes, and the guestion of whether a system is
intelligent or not.

This distinction must be kept in mind when

reading the vast array of literature on the Chinese Room and
AI itself.
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NOTES
l.The term 'symbol' is somewhat ambiguous. One usage is
such that something can only be a symbol i f i t is viewed a.s
symbolic of something else. The notion of symbolism, something
standing for something else, is semantic. The usage here is
syntactic, referring to the figure itself: '<"', '@', '¥', 'z', '$' •
2John Searle, "Minds and Brains without Programs," in
Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and
Consciousness, ed. Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield (New
York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 215.
3The Chinese Room is discussed in several publications
by Searle. The best known is "Minds, Brains, and Programs," The
Beha vioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980>: 417-457. This includes
numerous commentaries representing all parts of cogni ti ve
science.
4John Searle, "Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?"
Scientific American 262 (January 1990): 26.
5John Searle, Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge:
Harvard Uni versi t y Press, 1984), 39-41.
6For a discussion of eliminative materialism as a theory
in the philosophy of mind, see Paul Church land, Matter and
Consciousness, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 43-49.
Searle and Church land cri tigue each others' position in "Is the
Brain's Mind a Computer Program?" and "Could a Machine Think?"
Scientific American 262 (January 1990): 26-37.
7' John C. Eccles, "A Dualist -Interactionist Perspective.
Commentary on Searle's 'Minds, Brains, and Programs'." The
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 430.

ElJohn Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," The
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 452-53.
'ii'Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, eds., The
Mind's I (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 377.
iOlbid.
1S ear l e , "Minds, Brains, and Programs," 452.
2John Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 121.
1.3Daniel Dennett, "The Milk of Human Intentionality.
Commentary on Searle's 'Minds, Brains, and Programs'," The
Beha vioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 429.
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:14S ear l e , Minds, Brains, and Science, 34.
1sSear l e , "Minds, Brains, and Programs," 419.
1.6Marvin Minsky, "Minds are Simply What Brains Do." Truth
2 (1988): 11.
17S ear l e , "Minds, Brains, and Programs," 452.
1sHofstadter and Dennett, 373.
19Term used by Dennett, 429.
2°Ned Block, "What Intuitions about Homunculi Don't Show.
Commentary on Searle's 'Minds, Brains, and Programs'." The
Beha vioural and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 425.
21For readers with computer backgrounds, Ed designates
specific flashlights to serve as internal and external memory.
Flashlights in our solar system would serve as one register
and likewise for other systems. Whole systems would have
normal hexadecimal addresses. The H-demon is really just a
super, serial data-bus. It carries the appropriate on-off
signals to flip-flops (flashlights).
22To be precise, Searle believes mental terms are not
captured by full physical explanations but should be
eventually. These explanations will not, however, support the
RR model. Dualists, on the other hand, hold that mental
phenomena is not fully reducible to physical phenomena even in
principle.
~

23Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on
Mind and Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1978),
272.
24Baker, Lynne Rudder, Saving Belief: A Critigue of
Physicalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987),
152.
2SS ee the "combination reply" in Searle, "Minds, Brains,
and Programs," 421. Searle's argument is along the lines of EP,
although he does not use these terms.

27Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul (New York:
Clarendon Press, 1986), 196-197.
2SAnticipating the outcry from my theistic readers, I
realize I have limited x so that God is likewise not a candidate
for Ix. Please note that the predicate I is to be taken in a
restricted sense along the lines of intelligent-l ike-ourselves.

j-...- - - - - - - - - - -
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God is certainly intelligent in the common sense of the term,
but he is not intelligent-like-ourselves. This is clearly seen
in God's omniscience, which is something gui te different from
intelligent -like-oursel ves.

I
I

..l________________.....
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CHAPTER 2
THE FRAME PROBLEM
Within a generation the problem of creating artificial intelligence will be
substantially solved.
Marvin Minsky
Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines,
The AI problem is one of the hardest science has ever undertaken.
Marvin Minsky
"How Can Computers Cet Common Sense?" ~'-==

In Chapter 1 we saw how the rules-and-representations
model of cognition used by GOFAI (good-old-fashioned-AD failed
to distinguish computer syntax from semantics.

In this chapter

we will examine another problem that has plagued GOFAI for two
decades:

the frame problem (hereafter FP).

Before I say what the problem is, the reader should be
warned about some side issues.

First, there are many articles

in print that show how some writer mistakenly identifies the
"real" FP and then goes on to clear things up_

Unfortunately,

these articles do not always agree on what the real FP is.

I

will not try to sort out this confusion nor will I adopt anyone
writer's choice of terms. 'FP' here will represent the most
general rubric for several related and over-lapping topics one
of which might be called the frame problem proper.
Second, the FP is related to but not the same as a
"frame," "script," or "schemata."

These terms, now common in

the AI literature, refer to a programming strategy employed to
help overcome the FP.

This particular strategy will be

discussed at the end of the chapter.
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The FP is a guest ion about the relation of propositions
to one another.

Persons, we observe, make key adjustments to

their noetic web of propositions without being told to do so.
All the sub-topics wi thin the FP, to be discussed in Section II,
rela te to the digital computer's inability to either draw on or
properly manipulate propositions the system already contains.:1
I will not offer a solution to the FP here.

My goal is to

demonstra te a rational ability we have that computers lack.
This lack emphasizes the gap between man and machine that
strong-AI claims to have bridged.
1. Setting the Stage: Background Knowledge

Before jumping into the subtopics that collecti vel y make
up the FP, I would like to introduce a related difficulty.

This

information should help the reader gain a foothold in the
discussion.

Perhaps the easiest way to introduce the problem

of background knowledge is with my fa vori te illustration by
Daniel Dennett, the man perhaps most responsible for bringing
the FP to the attention of the AI community.

Consider the

"snack problem."
! couldn't make a sandwich without knowing a good deal--about
bread, spreading mayonnaise, opening the fridge, the friction
and inertia that will keep the turkey between the bread slices
and the bread on the plate as I carry the plate over the table
beside my easy chair. . .. I listed a few of the very many
humdrum facts one needs to know to solve the snack problem,
but I didn't mean to suggest that tllose facts are stored in
me--or in any agent--piecemeal, in the form of a long list of
sentences explicitly declaring each of tllese facts for the
benefit of tile agent. . .. We know trillions of things; we know
that mayonnaise doesn't dissolve knives on contact, that a
slice of bread is smaller than Mount Everest, that opening the
refrigerator doesn't cause a nuclear holocaust in the
kitchen.2
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Ra tional agents have the ability to form, not just call up from
memory, the specific propositions reguired to solve everyday
problems.

As Dennett points out, there are many propositions

that we "know" but do not directly consider as we go about our
day.
The problem of background knowledge arises due to the
program reguirements of serial computers.;::!;

To solve any

problem, a computer must be given a data base of all
proposi tions needed to solve that problem (i.e., the initial
condi tions) plus instructions about how these propositions
relate.

The difficulty lies in programming the computer to use

its data base appropria tel y.

Of course, the notion of

'appropriate' is gui te vague.

Somehow we draw on our

experience to make inferences that relate to our present
situation.

A computer must be instructed (i.e., programmed) to

make similar right inferences--"right" being another ill-defined
notion in this context.
One major difficulty in this project is that we are not
sure ourselves what principles we use to learn from
experience.

Margaret Boden, a prominent AI writer-philosopher,

believes that in all human reasoning there are unformalized
"integra ti ve principles of tad t inference or global knowledge
of which one is not introspecti vel y aware." 4

Al though the

nature of these principles is of great interest, we do not need
to fully understand how we use our experience to in fact make
use of it.

I

..J..____________________~
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This pragmatic use-it-without-understanding-it approach
is fine for humans.

Nonetheless, whatever these principles are

that we take advantage of, computers do not have them--thus
the problem.

Once again, all ini tial conditions plus the

principles of inference between propositions must be provided
for the computer.

Since we do not know ourselves how we in

fact make use of experience, it is no surprise that formalizing
this ability into computer code is a formidable task.
How past experience affects future events is of course
not a new puzzle.

The problem of induction remains unsolved

wi th no solution on the horizon.

The background knowledge

problem might simply be a byproduct of the problem of induction,
but, as Dennett rightly points out, the FP as a whole will
remain even i f induction is resolved.
later.

I will come back to this

Let's now move on to a variety of topics that all claim

to be at least part of the FP.
II. The Frame Problem(s)
The FP in its broad sense is a computer's inability to
"know" how any single piece of information affects the rest of
a data base.

Let's say for simplicity's sake that a data base,

a t a certain level of description, contains propositions.

When

a programmer inputs a new proposition, how does a computer
determine which other propositions are affected?

There is

currently no way to determine which specific propositions are
to be changed without an exhaustive search of the data base.
Such a search, however, is highly inefficient and not
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compu tat ion all y practical given the time restraints we put on
intelligence (i.e., systems that take days to solve simple
problems are not considered candidates for intelligence even
by strong-AD.
To illustrate, say I have a large stack of index cards,
wi th one sentence per card, that collecti vel y explains the
United States strategy for arms negotiations with the Soviet
Union.

Intelligence sources then report that the Soviets have

secretly withdrawn all troops from Poland.

This new

informa tion will reguire a revision in some of the sentences on
my index cards, but how many and which ones?

The only way to

know is to look through them all.
Dennet t sees the FP not as a technical hurdle for AI,
but a general epistemic guestion:

How does any cogni ti ve

creature know which conceptual propositions need to be updated
to keep one's internal model "roughly faithful to the world."s

I

will of course limit the discussion to the AI realm and not
explore the larger epistemic guestion.
For the most part, this section will only present the
difficulties for AI.

How programmers do in fact circumvent (or

a t least minimize) the FP will be dealt with in Section III.
Let's now examine the components of this large problem.
A. Data Retrieval.

Assuming that all the reguisi te facts

for solving a given range of guestions are provided in a data
base, how does a computer get to these facts to make use of
them?

Well-known AI critic Hubert Dreyfus explains,
To establish that a fact exists in its data banks a computer

Koperski

41

must retrieve it. Worse, to establish that some fact is not in
the data bank requires examining the entire list of what the
computer knows to determine that the fact in question is
missing. 6

In contrast, Dreyfus cites Richard Shaffer's example of our
(usuall y) direct access to our knowledge.7'

I know immedia tel y

when I was born and with some thought I can recall when my
mother was born.

I know immedia tel y that I do not know when

Thomas Jefferson was born and no amount of thinking will
retrieve that information.

I know that I do not know it.

In a

computer, only an exhaustive search can reveal the absence of
any fact.
If the reader does not think exhaustive searching is

much of a hindrance, especially with the speeds at which modern
computers operate, consider that the world's best chess
playing system, Carnegie-Mellon's "Deep Thought," can calculate
750,000 positions per second.

By 1992, the rate should exceed

one billion positions per second. s

For the system to calculate

the best move in any given si tua tion, an exhaustive search of
all possible counter-moves and counter-counter-moves, etc.,
would have to be made.

However, i t is estimated that there

are 10 1 2 0 different possible games of chess.

Even i f Deep

Thought could calculate a billion games per second, an
exhaustive search would take over 100 trillion trillion
centuries.

This will not do.

How is i t that the chess program

on my PC thrashes me in much less time?
The answer is that programmers are well aware of
algorithms for more efficient data base searching-

One such
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Heuristic rules are short-

cuts or rules-of-thumb that people often use in decision
making.

For example, in chess I use rules-of-thumb like 'don't

sacrifice a bishop to capture a knight'.

Rules like this are a

common programming tool to help cutdown compu ta tion time.
There are two major problems with the heuristic
solu tion.

First, the approach makes the problem less

noticeable but fails to solve it.

For a data base search that

is both accurate and fast, very specific heuristics are
reguired.

Such rules are often hard to specify when the data

becomes overly large and complex.
problematic:

The second objection is more

the rules don't always apply.

As any chess player

knows, sometimes you have to sacrifice the bishop.

The second

is a more formidable problem since the computer has no way of
determining when such rule breaking is allowed unless there is
yet another rule to tell it to do so.

That is, the system would

need second order heuristics for breaking first order
heuristics, and so on.

A point of diminishing returns develops

such that the time spent searching for applicable rules
sacrifices the time saved by employing heuristics in the first
place.
To digress for a moment, this need for rule breaking
points to what some call the hard/soft paradox of AI. <;>

Some

human reasoning appears to be rule-governed (e.g., logic,
grammar, etc.).

The computer's algorithmic ("hard") rules are

perfectly suited to simulate such thinking.

Hard rules cannot
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be violated except by the instruction of another hard rule.
In everyday situations, however, we find many instances
where rules are appropriately broken.
not throw cold water on your wife'.

Consider the rule 'do

This rule should

immediately be broken if my wife's hair catches fire.

The

"soft" side of human reasoning is the ability to intuit
circumstances that call for extreme or unusual action.

In

these cases, the computer's algorithmic rules become a
hindrance.
I can think of few rules of behavior that persons should
not violate under any condition.

I do not believe, however,

that I have a ready made criteria for identifying the
circumstances under which such rule breaking is reguired.
Such decisions must often be made "on the spot."

This need for

adaptability is a notorious problem for AI.
In sum, although programming technigues such as heuristic
rules lessen the data retrieval problem, no method thus far
has solved it.

There appears to be a profound difference

between men and digital computers regarding memory itself and
the relation between memory and behavior.
B. Relevant Facts.

Perhaps the key difficulty in the FP

is determining the relevancy of facts.

That is, given the vast

number of facts available to make any single decision, how can
a computer choose the relevant ones and ignore the rest?
Consider again my stack of index cards on arms
negotiations.

Someone asks "if the Soviets destroy half of
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I would

like to consider only those cards that have to do with cruise
missiles, but I don't know which ones they are until I search
through the whole stack skimming for the word 'cruise',
Furthermore, there may be some cards that do not have 'cruise'
on them, but are relevant to the question.
these wi thou t

How do I get to

wading through the entire stack again?

It

appears that the exhaustive search continues to be the only
way to be sure.
Again heuristic rules can be used to help determine
relevancy.

Consider Haugeland's theoretical computer with an

English language data base that must determine how to
interpret 'the pig is in the pen',:10
multiple uses in English.

'Pen' of course has

The computer must determine i f 'pen'

is a place on a farm or a writing instrument.

The relevant

fact for solving the ambiguity is that pigs cannot fit into a
writing instrument.

The problem is, how does the computer

determine the relevant fact in this case has to do with size?
How does the computer determine the key feature in any case?
A possible solution to the Haugeland example is that "in"
usually has a size implication.

The computer could solve the

ambigui t y with the heuristic semantic rule 'a sentence of the
form "x is in y" implies that y is larger than x'.
to this solution is twofold.

The drawback

First, as the number of semantic

rules like this one becomes large, the computer would need
meta-semantic rules to determine which semantic rules are
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How will the computer know if any of these rules

(semantic, meta-semantic, and so on) should be broken?
rules for rule breaking are reguired

Once again,

heuristics push the problem back but do not solve it.
"in" is itself ambiguous in this context.

More

Second,

This particular

semantic rule will not work for the sentence 'The pig is in the
photograph'.

Other non-heuristic methods for determining

relevant fact will be presented in the next section.
Before moving on, let me refer back to the problem of
induction.

Following Dennett, let's assume a computer has

somehow overcome the problem and now has perfect inductive
"beliefs."

The computer still suffers from the FP since it will

still have no way of prioritizing this massive array of beliefs
about the future.

Exhaustive knowledge about the future,

based on past experience, does not insure that such knowledge
will be used effectively.
A walking encyclopedia will walk over a cliff, for all its
knowledge of cliffs and the effects of gravity, unless it is
designed in such a fashion that it can find the r.l9..bl bits of
knowledge at the r.l9..bl times, so it can plan its engagements
with the real world (emphasis mine),"

C. Selective Updating:

The Bookkeeping Problem.

Some

consider the bookkeeping problem to be the key difficulty of
the FP.

Consider a data base of propositions tha t collectively

form a model of, say, a desk with colored blocks on it:
Blockworld.

Let the model be output in three dimensional

graphics so everyone can see IrJha t Blockworld looks like.
Blockworld is set up to correspond to a group of real colored
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Thus when I turn the blue block on my desk

on its side, I input a new proposition, p, to the Blockworld
model, p = 'The blue block is turned on its side'.
The question is, which other propositions need to be
revised when p is added to keep the model accurate?

Of course

all of the propositions which contain 'blue block' might need
revision and only those need be considered i f the blu,e block is
alone in the middle of the desk.
are stacked on the blue block?

But what i f ten other blocks
Now a large number of spatial

propositions need to be revised that do not contain 'blue
block',
Depending on the overall si tua tion, some propositions
must be updated and others left alone.

Provided that causal

interactions are all part of the model (e.g. moving blue block
causes ten others to fall), the computer must access each
proposition in the model to find i f i t needs revision.

But as

we saw, exhaustive searches are time consuming and heuristics
alone do not solve the problem.

An efficient method for

selectively updating only the relevant information is required.
Of course this assumes the relevant facts problem has already
been solved.
Let's now look at some of the programming techniques
used to circumvent the FP.
III. Repairs and Solutions
A. Repairs.

To lessen the effects of the FP, some

applications use the "cheap test.":l.2

The program contains
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commands that exclude irrelevant parts of the data base from
the search.

For example, in Blockworld there might be a

limi ting rule like 'when an object moves, color and size are not
affected'.

The data base could be easily organized so that

propositions about color and size are grouped.

The program

would then "flag" these groups to exclude them from the search.
Unfortunately, the cheap test is actually a kind of
heuristic and is subject to the drawbacks mentioned earlier.
Furthermore, such limiting rules do not always apply.

If the

objects in Blockworld are ice cubes or clay, for example,
friction will change the shape of the blocks when they are
moved.

By now the reader should see the relationship between

the scope of application and the proportional need for more
(perhaps second order) rules.
Another programming techniClue is the "sleeping dog"
approach.:1.3

The program is instructed to leave all

propositions alone unless there is some positive reason to
revise them.

That is, when a new proposition is introduced, the

program assumes that without sufficient warrant or
computational relevance nothing else in the data base is
affected.
The glaring difficulty with using the sleeping dog
approach in any general application is how to specify
"sufficient warrant" or "computational relevance."

Defining

these terms and then encoding them for the computer
I do not mean to imply that either the cheap test or the

the FP!
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They are gui te sufficient

for dealin9 with a variety of applications.

The criticisms here

are intended to show that neither is able to solve the FP for
very general or complex applications.
As Dennett has pointed out, there appears to be another
inherent problem with all such relevancy tests.:L4

The 90a1 is

to make the system limit its focus to only certain <i.e.,
"relevant") inferences.

The two approaches mentioned add a

relevancy axiom to cut down on the calculated inferences.
Dennet t points out, however, that in any (monotonic) deductive
system, the addition of an axiom never reduces the number of
inferences a vailable, it always increases them.

Otherwise, the

new axiom must be inconsistent with a previous one.
For example, consider a closed deductive system with
five axioms.

Let's say that there are twenty proofs calculable

from these axioms.

Now add a sixth axiom.

If Axiom 6 makes any

of the previous twenty proofs invalid, it is inconsistent with
one of the first five axioms.

Say Axiom 6 is consistent with

the first five and is a relevancy test which is supposed to
limit the number of inferences.

Instead of limiting steps, the

program will calculate all the same inferences (the twenty
proofs) plus calculate their relevancy (i.e., solve the proofs
that follow from the addition of Axiom 6, the relevancy test).
What we really want is for the system to ignore
irrelevant data, not calculate that the data is irrelevant and
then i9nore it.

No one wants a computer to waste valuable
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compu ta tion time calculating all of the propositions tha t it
can ignore.
B. Scripts: A REAL solution?

The most successful

solution to the FP to date is the use of "scripts" (Schank),
"frames" (Minsky), and "schemata" (Rumelhart).

For those

unfamiliar with field, the difference is negligible.

The

dissimilarity lies in the degree of a program's "anticipation."
Here are the computer scientists' own explanations of this
approach:
Minsky: A frame is a data-structure for representing a
stereotyped situation, like being in a certain kind of living
room, or going to a child's birthday party. Attached to each
frame are several kinds of information. Some of this
informa tion is about how to use the frame.
Some is about wha t
one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if
these expectations are not confirmed. . .. Much of the
phenomenological power of the theory hinges on the inclusion of
expectations and other kinds of presumptions. 15
Schank: We define a script as a predetermined causal chain of
conceptualiza tions that describe the normal sequence of things
in a familiar situ a tion. Thus there is a restaurant script, a
birthday-party script, a football game script, a classroom
script, and so on. 16

The abili t y-to-ignore, lacking in other techniClues, is not
attained through the addition of a new IGNORE-algorithm in the
program.

Instead the system's attention is focused by the

stereotypical expectations of the script.
This anticipatory behavior of a script roughly simulates
our own day-to-day interactions.

When someone enters a

familiar si tua tion, like Schank's football game script, he has
certain expectations and customary actions that help him to
socially negotiate the activity.

If he encounters something
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hi'3hly unusual, say his chili-do'3 bursts into a chorus of "God
Save the Queen," it takes time to sort ou t what's '3oin'3 on and
what the appropriate reactions mi'3ht be.
Similarly a robot runnin'3 scripted software has no
difficulties within the prepro'3rammed expectations.

That is,

when the robot's encounters fit the script, its reactions are
easily accessed by the prO'3ram thus circumventin'3 exhaustive
searches, relevancy tests, etc.

Abnormal encounters take

10n'3er to deal with, not unlike reactions in persons.
There are some usual guestions a GOFAI cri tigue asks at
this point.

The first of which usually involves adaptability:

Does the script technigue allow for a wide ran'3e of
applica tions 7:1.7

When thin'3s proceed as usual, the computer's

script can deal with most problems and has an acceptable ran'3e
of adaptability.

I will not defend this assertion except to say

computer scientists would not continue to pursue such a
research prO'3ram wi thou t limited success.

When thin'3s come

"out of the blue" however, like the aberrant chili-dog, the
computer's reactions are often not foreseen nor acceptable.
A more severe problem is related to the relevancy test.
Not only do persons determine which facts are relevant in a
'3iven scenario, but they also assign different degrees of
relevancy to them.

We are able to adapt to different "levels

of weirdness" as John Searle puts it.

But even scripted

software is not able to prioritize its expectations to suit
dHferent situations.

For example, in Schank'$. re$.taurant
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script, "it is equally 'weird' for the restaurant to be out of
food as it is for the customer to respond by devouring the
chef.":19

The singing chili-dog is just as strange in the

football script as kicking a seventy yard field goal.
How is it tha t

~..§..

recognize degrees of weirdness?

At

least part of the answer is that we are not isolated to facts
within a given script; we have access to other facts about
cuI tural norms and interpersonal relations.

For example, a

woman without a top walking on a beach is highly irregular (i.e.,
the situation, not the woman) in America but not in France.

An

isolated group of "beach facts" cannot be assigned degrees of
abnormali t y without knowledge of cultural norms.

Notice how

the relevancy test, degrees of relevancy, and background
knowledge problems all come into play here.
8i ven these problems with the script technique, why has
it been such a successful research program?
ironically yields another criticism:
a vailable wi thin each script.:L9

The answer

there is an ad hoc fix

As a programmer debugs a given

script, he usually stumbles onto the abnormalities that go
beyond the software's ability to adapt.

At these specific

points, a direct contingency command is implanted to prevent
the system from "locking up" or doing whatever undesired
activit y it tends to fall into when confronted with aberrant
data.

Individual scripts can always be saved in this way.
For example, consider a simple algebraic computer

program written in BASIC in which some variable A is used in

Koperski

several eCluations.
(B+C)/A'.

52

One of the lines of the program is '500

The programmer notices that if the variable A is

zero, then line 500 will generate an error message:
zero is algebraically undefined.

division by

To circumvent this problem,

the programmer can put in a line '490 If A=O, then 550' which
instructs the program to skip over line 500 and execute line
550 i f A is zero.

This strategy is a perfectly acceptable

hoc fix for preventing division by zero, but it is obvious 1y
restricted to this problem.
Unfortunately, ad hoc solutions are not sufficient to
solve the FP in general.

Scripts are a useful approach for

solving specific problems but this strategy cannot overcome
the digital computer's chronic lack of adaptability.
Scripted software was hoped to be the key to solving a
host of GOFAI puzzles.

In the early 80's it became evident

that current scripts were not performing as expected and some
of the strong-AI rhetoric started to be toned down.

For

example, compare Minsky's 1967 Cluote at the beginning of the
chapter with this one from 1981:
Just constructing a knowledge base is a major intellectual
research problem. . .. We still know far too little about the
contents and structure of common-sense knowledge.
A 'minimal'
common-sense system must 'know' something about cause-andeffect, time, purpose, locality, process, and types of
knowledge . . . , We need a serious epistemological research
effort in this area.:20

Let's assume that scripts in the future will overcome
all the aspects of the FP mentioned so far.

There appear to

be two more problems on the horizon that affect this approach.
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IV. Future Hurdles
A. The Folding Problem.

Assume for the moment that

humans work from something like scripts.

As I sit here in the

midst of my thesis-script, say I come to a sticking point--I
just don't know how to work out some conceptual problem.

But I

recall from my history-class-script that in World War II the
Americans, in order to liberate others, ini tiall y bypassed well
fortified islands held by the Japanese.

I take the "principle"

(an admit tedl y ill defined notion that I will not shore up here)
of temporarily bypassing difficult obstacles and apply it wi thin
my thesis-script by moving on to the next topic.

In script

terminology, I have folded information from two unrelated
scripts.

Programming a computer to do likewise is the heart of

the "folding problem."
Within the limited universe of a given script, some AI
programs adapt well to new information and can generally limit
the crunch of the FP.

Some Alers believe that when enough

powerful scripts are loaded into one compu tel"', it will behave
intelligently in all script-scenarios and therefore, under
GOFAI, will be intelligent.
The folding problem is simply this:

computers do not

channel general principles between isolated scripts.

As my

previous illustration shows, we are able to learn from a given
situation and apply our knowledge to new unrelated settings.
All inferential ties between software scripts, in contrast,
must be determined in advance.
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Furthermore, there are also instances when whole,
unrelated scripts need to be integrated.

Assuming persons

rely on a restaurant-script and a birthday-part y-script, we
can easily fold these two scripts together when a birthday
part y is held in a restaurant.

Such smooth combinations of

discrete scripts do not just emerge within a program.

To solve

the folding problem, programmers must find a way to tie
together the conceptual archipelago of multiple scripts.
8. The Jumping Problem.

Closely related to the folding

problem, the jumping problem is the computer's inability to make
a smooth transition between scripts.
For example, say you are eating lunch at the Western
Steer (i.e., are in the middle of your restaurant-script) when
your colleague, who has illegally made his third trip to the
one-time-onl y salad bar, begins choking on a tomato.

You must

immediately transition from your restaurant-script to a
choking-script to save his life.

An observing computer

meandering through its restaurant-script has no ready made
way of jumping to another.

Inference bridges would have to be

provided in advance between all possibly connected scripts-obviously demanding a great deal of foresight on the part of
the programmer.
Scripts are unguestionably useful within a well defined
scenario.

The folding and jumping problems show, however, that

dail y cogni ti ve acti vi ties reguire interaction between normal,
stereotypical situations.

In the next section I will examine
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That is, some claim

the FP is a pseudo-problem.
V. A Real Problem?
The most outspoken antagonist of the FP is Drew
McDermott.

His criticism is three-pronged. 2

:1

First, the above

mentioned sleeping dog method has been a sufficient
programming technigue for most of the last fifteen years.

It

is so successful, in fact, that no one in the field is even
working on a solution to this mythical FP!

Second, regarding

intelligence, we do not make the same demands of perfection on
humans that the FP imposes on computers.
cannot take

That is, humans

relevant information into account when such

facts become numerous.

Information overload is a problem for

all cogni ti ve beings, not just computers.

Third, the

philosopher-cri tics ("framist") who push the FP are a moving
target.

Once AIers begin to answer the real FP, framists shift

to other " re l a ted" problems that are themselves able to be
overcome.
Patrick Hayes, in the article right after McDermott's in
one anthology, responds to McDermott's challenge.
The frame problem is sometimes dismissed as being a
technical problem of little philosophical interest. , "
this is a mistake, For one thing, a 'narrow technical
which is this immediate, this central, this devastating,
resistant to solution is worthy of some respect,22

Why isn't anyone working on the FP?

narrow,
J think
problem'
and this

Because, as I pointed out

earlier, for each script under consideration, there is always
an

=-='--'-:..=-.::::..

fix that takes care of that and only that script.
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Wha tever this fix maybe, it generally is not applicable to
another script.
The overload problem in McDermott's second prong is for
the most part correct.

Although he fails to consider our

abilities to prioritize incoming information based on
experience, McDermot t rightly points out that GOFAI critics
should not demand that a computer surpass man's cognitive
abili ties.

All finite beings can consider only a finite number

of propositions at one time and are thus subject to
informa tion overload.

McDermott's point is granted, but

unfortunately for GOFAI, the FP is more than just a breakdown
of information management.
Another reason for taking the FP seriously, albeit a
somewha t anecdotal one, is that it appears to be at the heart
of the "conversion" of one of GOFAI's key workers, Terry
Winograd.

According to Dreyfus, Winograd now teaches

Heidegger to his computer science students at Stanford to help
show the difficulties of formalizing background knowledge and
making scripts interact. 2 3

The point is, McDermott is simp 1y

wrong when he claims that computer scientists do not feel the
tension of the FP.

Winograd is the most visible strong-AI

"defector" to date.
VI. Conclusion
How does this chapter support my overall case against
strong-AI?

I believe the problem helps show that human

knowers are different from (at =-==-=::...:::.. disitaD computers in kind;
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The rational, human ability

to make key changes to one's noetic web without rules or
instructions on how to make such changes is not shared by
program driven systems.

The FP shows that simply having more

powerful programs/rules does not eliminate the problem.

This

unigue rational ability is evidence that men are more that very
fast, very powerful, and very complex rule-governed machines.
As long as this man-machine gap remains in place, the claims of
strong-AI will retain their status as optimistic exaggerations.
To conclude, I would like to digress into epistemology
proper for a moment.

In most epistemic models, except very

pure forms of coherence justification, philosophers realize
that some beliefs play a more significant role in our noetic
structure than others.

These "weightier" beliefs support the

lesser ones or at least reguire a greater amount of evidence
before they may be revised.

How beliefs relate to and rely on

one another is a subject of great debate (e.g., what is it for
one proposition to be evidence for another?).

Understanding

the nature of this relation is not reguired for persons to, in
fact, hold and prioritize their beliefs.
This lack of knowledge about knowledge will not do for
GOFAI.

Programmers must guess how inference, evidence, and

even induction work and then go on to formalize these opague
notions.

In this light, it is little wonder why philosopher's

often view GOFAI claims with skepticism.
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NOTES
1.Recall the anthropomorphic qualifier in my introduction.
I will use "proposition" in a nominalist sense to make i t
applicable to computers. This move is not meant to imply any
bias in philosophy of language or metaphysical controversies.
2Daniel Dennett, "Cogni ti ve Wheels: The Frame Problem of
AI," in Minds, Machines, and Evolu tion, ed. Christopher Hookwa y
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versi t y Press, 1984), 134-136.
:3My computer literate readers are already wondering
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CHAPTER 3
THE OVERSEER PROBLEM
If we are to avoid the morass of metaphysics [!], we must reduce as
many concepts as possible to numerical terms. On the other hand, we
must face the fact that the most important aspects of human life are
intrinsically nonnumerical. Any attempt to ignore this is highly unscientific.
In the true intellectual approach, one accepts this fact and copes with it.
Richard Bellman
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn Symposium on
the Mathematical Theory of Automata, 1962

The conceptual difficulties discussed in the last two
chapters usually involve serial digital computers.

On the

cutting edge of computer technology lies another architecture
that may very well overcome both the challenge of the Chinese
Room and the Frame Problem.

The programmes are often called

connectionism, parallel distributed processing (PDP), neural
networks, and massively parallel systems, although these names
are not fully synonymous.

There is unfortunately no space

here to provide an adequate overview of this new approach,
however, there are a handful of introductory articles
a vailable.:t
In this chapter I will present another problem for
strong-AI that affects both conventional computers and PDP.

I

must ask the reader to assume that what I attribute to PDP is
correct and not open for discussion at this point.

The purpose

here is not to quibble about what PDP does or how it
accomplishes its tasks; I will simply grant most of the claims
made by computer scientists in this young field.

I will then go

on to show tha t neither digital computers nor PDP's escape

I
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wha t I call the Overseer Problem <oP).
1. Connectionism: The New Frontier

Recall my Blockworld illustration from Chapter 2.

In

short, the computer's program constructs an internal model of
a room with colored blocks.

The key to Blockworld is the

software: the better the program, the better the model.
contrast, PDP does not use a program.

In

Instead the system is

trained (invoking the anthropomorphic gualifier one last time)
through examples.

That is, the system develops its own

generalizations and internal representations from particular
examples without algorithmic instructions on how this
representation is to be constructed.
For example, let's say a given neural net receives input
from a video camera that is pointed at various live dogs.
After a large number of sample-dogs has been given to the net,
the system will form an internal representation of a paradigmdog.

Once trained (not programmed) the net can distinguish

dogs from other objects.

Giving a sophisticated net a great

deal of training should allow it to distinguish dogs from cats,
cows, and perhaps even from statues of dogs.
For the reader whose knowledge of computers is limited
to the digital variety, it might be difficult at first to
appreciate the tremendous difference between a conventional
and a non-programmable system.

The key is that no program

means no rules; PDP rejects the RR theory of cognition.

1

I

I

The approach that we take in developing PDP models is
completely different [from serial digital computers]. First, we
do not assume tl1at the goal of learning is tl1e formulation of
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explicit rules. Rather, we assume it is the acquisition of
connection strengths which allow a network of simple units to
act as though it knew the rules. 2

PDP might offer a way around the Chinese Room since,
without a program, there is no (prescriptive) syntax. 3

Few are

claiming that neural nets are sophisticated enough to
"understand" a natural language; however, the syntax-semantics
distinction that the Chinese Room relies on is harder to define
when there is no program.

As for the Frame Problem, PDP

memory is not stored in data-bases but rather throughout the
net (cf. holographic images).

For reasons that I cannot explore

here, such content-based memory makes the relevant facts
issue much less of a problem.

Whether PDP can solve the Frame

Problem or the Chinese Room must wait for another time.

Let's

now examine the problem PDP does not escape.
II. The Overseer Problem
In short, the OP is the inability of artificial systems to
perform independently, that is, wi thou t

the prior assistance of

an intelligent agent to set the parameters of the system's
task and to determine when that task is to be considered
correct or complete. 4
trivial.

The task-determination part is somewhat

Humans, after all, usually design artifacts for the

purpose of carrying out specific tasks.

Task-completion and

valida tion, knowing when the job is done correctly, is another
matter.
A. The Overseer and PDP.
right or wrong answer?

How does PDP come to know a

What is the "right" answer to a problem
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for a system that has just been activated, ini ball y lacking any
data to work with?

Let's begin with a theoretical neural net

in action.
Consider a net designed to distinguish kinds of cars by
color and manufacturer.
from examples of cars.

First, the net must be "trained up"
To do this, the system is attached to a

video camera in a parking lot.

For training, the camera first

must be pointed at a car and then the net makes a random
guess of color and manufacturer.

Actually, at this early stage

the net does not have an internal representation of 'color' or
'manufacturer'; the guess is a true shot-in-the-dark.

The

net's trainer inputs a new signal that either reinforces the
current internal representation, in the case of a correct
guess, or alters the representation, in the case of a. wrong
guess.

After a large number of examples and correction

signals, the net is trained.

That is, the system has developed

a paradigm model for each color and each manufacturer,
respectively.

Now the camera can point to any car and the net

will determine the make and color.
The key to the OP is the role of the trainer.

Of course,

the trainer must determine the nature of the problem to be
solved.

More importantly, the trainer already has knowledge of

what constitutes a right or wrong response from the neural
net.

From the net's point of view, as it were, one answer is

just as good as the next.

The net has no objective reference

for determining correct results except by the feedback of the
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trainer.
For some readers, this analysis may be a matter of highlighting the obvious.

If so, recall the claims of strong-AI,

such as the opening quote of the introduction:

"We are about

to conceive of the knower as a computing machine."

The thrust

of the OP is that "the knower," i f he is to be given equal
cogni ti ve status to human agents, must be able to function
without an overseer to specify tasks and predetermine the
na ture of correct responses.

Al though I have found little

attention given to this problem, here are a couple of notable
quotes:
Our license to speak of these systems as judging similarity
depends upon the fact they classify together patterns that we
also take to be similar {emphasis mine).5
The problem here is that the designer has determined . . . that
certain possible generalizations will never be found. All this
is well and good for toy problems . . . but in real-world
situa tions a large part of human intelligence consists in
generalizing in ways that are appropriate to a context. If the
designer restricts the net to a predefined class of
appropriate responses, the net will be exhibiting the
intelligence built into it by the designer for the context but
will not have the common sense that would enable it to adapt
to other contexts, as a truly human intelligence would. S

B. The Overseer and GOFAI.
GOFAI.

The OP looms larger for

In PDP, the system only needs to be fed "right"

examples.

Likewise in programmed digital computers, correct

data must be input (recall the programmer's cliche "garbage in,
garbage out"),

Furthermore, the entire structure of the

computer's task must be defined in detail in the body of the
program.

Right and wrong are, in a manner of speaking, in the

eyes of the beholder--in this case the person writing the

.1
II1II6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
~~
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The computer does

nothing wi thou t an overseer-programmer to define a) the
problem, b) the nature of correct answers, and c) a detailed
algori thm for how the problem is to be addressed.
requirement,

(c:),

The last

makes the OP stronger for GOFAI than for PDP

since, once again, the latter has no program.
C. Objection: PDP Can Overcome OPe

The unique abiE ties

of PDP might offer a way to overcome the OPe

There is, the

objection runs, no need for a program and therefore no need
for a programmer-overseer.

Inherent in the PDP architecture

is a
very simple mechanism for extracting regularities from an
ensemble of inputs without the aid of sophisticated
generalization or rule-formulating mechanisms that oversee the
performance of the processing system. These learning rules
are completely local, in the sense that they change the
connection between one unit and another on the basis of
information that is locally available to the connection rather
than on the basis of global information about overall
performance. The model thus stands as an alternative to the
view that learning in cognitive systems involves the explicit
formulations of rules and abstractions under the guidance of
some explicit overseer (emphasis mine).7

Unlike a programmed computer, neural nets form
conceptual representations apart from any guidance on how this
formation is to be done.

For example, our own conceptual

schemes intended to represent the physical world rely heavily
on our five senses.

The distinguishing features of objects

are often given in terms of shape, color, size, texture, etc.
In contrast, consider another theoretical neural net
that distinguishes trees from telephone poles.

This net's

input consists of a TV camera, audio microphone, radar, and
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infrared detector.

With this array of choices from which the

net will build its paradigm-tree and paradigm-telephone-pole,
we have no idea nor control over what "sensory" input the net
will decide is significant.

The net's determination of

significance and its internal representation are completely
unknown to any programmer-overseer.

In Kantian terms, we do

not know what categories the net will develop to distinguish
the two kinds of objects.
Anyone who fully understands the OP will see that this
a t tempt to escape the problem will not do.

First, an overseer

is reguired to define a problem for the net to solve.

Second,

even without an algorithm for solving the tree-pole problem,
the neural net still reguires an overseer to say whether the
output during training is right or wrong.

Without this

feedback, the net cannot build its paradigms.

Third, the net's

abili ty to make generalizations can only be exercised i f it is
gi ven the correct exemplars on which to base its model.

Three

trees may be sufficient to give the net some prototype of
'tree,' but what if the trainer mistakenly inputs a bush?

Then

the paradigm is distorted and the net's performance is
diminished.

In this way the accuracy of the net's future

performance is wholly dependent on being pro perl y trained,
where "proper" is once again in the eyes of the overseer.
III. Induction
At this point, I would like to demonstrate the OP in
action.

The problem of induction has stubbornly refused to
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succumb since the time of Hume and, with Goodman's help, it has
actually intensified.

Let's see how the problem of induction

(PI) and the overseer problem jointly pose a conceptual snare
for strong-AI.
We want computers to make the "right" inferences based
on experience.
inferences.

Then again, we hope to make similar right

When are we justified in going from "x j3's have all

been found to be y" to "all j3'S are y" or even "it is probable
that the next j3 I observe will be y"?
required?

How many observations are

Since the PI is still unsolved, we can only observe

that we do in fact make judgments about the future based on
past experience.
How does a computer solve the PI?
works out the solution in advance.

Answer: An overseer

To illustrate, recall from

Chapter 2 the "script" technique in programming.

Stereotypical

situations (e.g., the restaurant script, the ball game script)
are given to the computer as guidelines to opera te within.
However, to describe a given situation as "stereotypical"
implies that we already know what regularities are to be
expected in the future in such a scenario.

This simply ignores

the PI, as we almost always do in our day-to-day routines.

A

scripted program is a safety net provided by the overseer to
insure that the system makes the "right" inferences.

Thus the

system never faces real induction.
Al though things are better for PDP, the overseer is
often presupposed in induction problems.

d

For instance, from a
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given number of exemplars the net will establish that "all
Trans Ams have been Pontiacs" and thus "the next Trans Am
examined will be a Pontiac."

However, if the goal of the

training is to get the net to form this "belief," obviously the
overseer must have been satisfied in advance that this belief
is true.
I should point out that part of the power of PDP is its
ability to make inferences and detect patterns not found by
humans looking at the same data.

For example, banks and

insurance companies currently use neural net simulations to
detect financial patterns that will help determine loan
applications, etc.

In some respects, neural nets are better at

induction than we are.

The reason this ability is insufficient

to solve the OP lies in the training.

For any net to make

inferences, an overseer is still reguired to train the net with
examples that the overseer already knows to be "correct"
inductive inferences.
To conclude the discussion on the PI, I would like to
address a conceptual issue arising from differences in
educa tion.

One reason AIers do not wrestle with induction the

wa y philosophers do is because engineers, ma thema ticians, and
computer scientists approach the subject through probability
theory.

An informal yet philosophically significant part of

probabili t y theory is what I will call the all-things-beingegual wand. s
To illustrate, I recall my introduction to probability

Koperski

theory in a communications class.

69

The professor would always

talk about the probability of a given event "all-things-beingegua1."

An example would be, liThe probability of this coin

coming up heads when flipped is 0.5, all-things-being-egual."
We understood that this gualifier meant we could ignore the
probability of a bird diving through the window and snatching
the coin or the probability of the coin spontaneously
decomposing.

For all such instances, the professor would

always wave the all-things-being-egual wand to eliminate
unwanted factors.
Returning to AI, without an overseer providing the 21.11things-being-egual wand for the computer, the system has no
way of "just knowing" what factors can legitimately be ruled
out.

Somehow all of the students in my communications class

understood what factors were eliminated by "all-things-beingegua1."

Unless computers can develop a similar ability, the

overseer will not fade into irrelevance.

And unless the

overseer fades into irrelevance, strong-AI claims will continue
to be exaggerated.
IV. Thesis Conclusion
There is a danger in criticizing AI that I have tried to
a void in this work.

Too often critics point to what computers

currently fail to do without a view toward advancing
technology.

This tactic is a trap:

Picking at the difficult

technological barriers and hardware-software limi ta tions faced
by AI today will inevitably backfire.

J
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For example, digital computers have had a longs·tanding
difficult y in processing and recognizing images.

Given

sufficient computing time, most systems could be programmed to
recognize faces; however, we have the ability to recognize a
given face almost immediately.

For years critics like Hubert

Dreyfus have cited "elementary" perceptual mistakes made by
computers that the average child could avoid.
image processing is gui te advanced.

Today, computer

Consider the accuracy of

Tomahawk cruise missiles used in the Gulf War.

With the help

of a maturing technology in charge-coupled devices, many of
Dreyfus' early criticisms about computer perception have now
been met.
Have I avoided this trap?

I'm not sure.

Unless digital

computer technology gives way to PDP, the Chinese Room will
retain its force (see note 3).

The Frame Problem may very IAJell

be solved or at least made much less noticeable in time and I
do not claim that it is an insurmountable difficulty.

The

Overseer Problem, however, is highly conceptual and will not
likely fall in the wake of new technology.

If I have left myself

vulnerable to the trap, so be it.
What has been accomplished in this thesis?

Instead of

simply recapping my arguments from Chapters 1-3, I would like
to address strong-AI in general.

The three chapters

indi viduall y raise guestions that must be answered before
AIers can claim that computers are intelligent.

I do not mean

that AI research should come to a stop until computer

d
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However, I

do think these concerns must be addressed before Alers
continue to lob conceptual bombs into metaphysics, the
philosophy of language, and particularly the philosophy of mind.
What has not been accomplished in this thesis?

I have

not developed criteria for intelligence tha t clearly demarcate
man from machine.

Such criteria would draw the discussion far

afield and would need to consider the problem of other minds
and perhaps Wit tgenstein's private language argument,
especiall y where the overseer/trainer is involved.

My goal was

the lesser task of tightening the reins on some in the AI community.

AI has unguestionably helped in the development of the

necessary conditions for intelligence.

Strong-AI claims,

however, lead the reader to believe that computer science has
already determined the sufficient conditions for intelligence.
This claim, I have shown, is too optimistic.
Finally, I urge readers from all disciplines to keep track
of their metaphors.

Every advanced field of study

incorporates rather innocent sounding words into the jargon of
the field.

In the case of computer science, words like 'sees',

'knows', and 'memory' are used to describe computers because
we know what such words mean when applied to people.
these words metaphorically, which is perfectly fine.
the metaphor is lost.

We use
Too often

Common words with technical meanings

start migrating between fields and then back to ordinary
speech.

d

It is regrettable when the man-in-the-street becomes
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When the scholar and the scientist

likewise become confused, entire world-views may hang in the
balance.

d
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1The best two articles available appear in the same
journal. See John L. Tienson, "An Introduction to
Connectionism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26,
supplement (1987): 1-16 and William Bechtel, "Connectionism and
the Philosophy of Mind: An Overview." The Southern Journal of
Philosophy 26, supplement (1987): 17-41.
2David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 1: Foundations,
(Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1986), 32
::SA prescriptive syntax, like a computer program, drives
the system. Executing a program is synonymous with following a
set of syntactic rules. Without a program, PDP has no driving,
prescripti ve syntax; however, its internal mechanism maybe
described syntactically. Although Searle believes the Chinese
Room is applicable to PDP since there is a syntactic
description available, I believe the Chinese Room fails unless
the syntax is prescriptive.
4John Searle has mentioned a similar problem to OP
called the "Homunculus Fallacy," but so far he has applied it
only to digi tal computers. See Searle, "Is the Brain a Digital
Computer?" APA Proceedings 64 (November 1990): 21-37,
especiall y pp. 28-29.
6Bechtel, 27.
6Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Stuart E. Dreyfus, "Making a
Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back at
Branchpoint," in The Artificial Intelligence Debate: False
Starts, Real Foundations, ed. Stephen R. Graubard (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1988), 38.
"7 James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and the PDP
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 2: Psychological and
Biological Models (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books,
1986)' 214.

BCf. Daniel Dennett, "Cogni ti ve Wheels: The Frame Problem
of AI," in Minds, Machines, and Evolution, ed. Christopher
Hookwa y (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versi t y Press, 1984), 144.
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